Tickets :: Comment on [#5892] Linked attachment feature vulnerability

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Comment	> The idea is that the server generate one unique id for each of the > email recipients, in such a way that the recipient could only open > his own attachment. Even if the attacker knows a valid id for his > evil file, that id should only work with his own horde account. For > the rest of the email recipients (who don't have accounts), there's > no problem, cause the main problem here is that the file is located > and run in the same domain of the recipient webmail account, that > makes possible the attack to happen. If you have the evil script > running on webmail.server1 and the victim has it's account on > webmail.server2, the script won't have the right permissions to XSS > the victim. > > For the "webmail.server1 attacker, webmail.server1 victim" problem, I > think that it's possible to check which attachment is "visible" to > which account. > > > >> But the attachments are sent to email _recipients_, who don't have > >> accounts. So how do you propose to enforce the uniqueness? The > >> attacker could send them any valid id. Secret doesn't matter. > >
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