Summary | gpg keys pair |
Queue | IMP |
Queue Version | 4.2 |
Type | Bug |
State | Not A Bug |
Priority | 1. Low |
Owners | |
Requester | kkkrrruuulll (at) yahoo (dot) it |
Created | 06/09/2008 (6236 days ago) |
Due | |
Updated | 06/10/2008 (6235 days ago) |
Assigned | |
Resolved | 06/09/2008 (6236 days ago) |
Github Issue Link | |
Github Pull Request | |
Milestone | |
Patch | No |
powers is likely opening up a *way* bigger security hole than any
security shortcomings you are trying to mask.
"crack" a db that a process ran with sudo
parameter --homedir (which value can be saved on user's preferences)
public/private keys and his keyrings already full
powers is likely opening up a *way* bigger security hole than any
security shortcomings you are trying to mask.
"crack" a db that a process ran with sudo
server running Horde. Not to mention that a web process having sudo
powers is likely opening up a *way* bigger security hole than any
security shortcomings you are trying to mask.
the private/hidden directory .gnupg of every user; horde/imp must use
gnupg command line (sudo'ed as spamassassin) for every operation
if you run gnugp sudo'ed with the logged user, i think it can access
the user's home
Priority ⇒ 1. Low
State ⇒ Not A Bug
the private/hidden directory .gnupg of every user; horde/imp must use
gnupg command line (sudo'ed as spamassassin) for every operation
Priority ⇒ 3. High
Type ⇒ Bug
Summary ⇒ gpg keys pair
Queue ⇒ IMP
Milestone ⇒
Patch ⇒ No
State ⇒ Unconfirmed
i think that horde/imp must use keys (and keyrings) contained into the
private/hidden directory .gnupg of every user; horde/imp must use
gnupg command line (sudo'ed as spamassassin) for every operation