[#5753] Minimize lacking PGP forward secrecy with webmail
Summary Minimize lacking PGP forward secrecy with webmail
Queue IMP
Queue Version HEAD
Type Enhancement
State Accepted
Priority 2. Medium
Owners
Requester libre (at) immerda (dot) ch
Created 09/27/2007 (646 days ago)
Due 09/27/2007 (646 days ago)
Updated 11/16/2008 (230 days ago)
Assigned
Resolved
Attachments
Milestone
Patch No

History
11/16/2008 Chuck Hagenbuch Version ⇒ HEAD
Queue ⇒ IMP
 
09/29/2007 horde (at) immerda (dot) ch Comment #4 Reply to this comment
Seems to me like if people use Horde to generate their key they 
should be able to download it at least at that specific time to back 
it up - and to get a warning then about losing it, etc. But 
otherwise this seems reasonable to me. Any other thoughts/objections?
the idea with the only download possibility while generating is great. 
However it might be as well a good idea to give the possibility to 
view/download a revocation certificate and/or send  one to a keyserver 
(like you can do it with your public key). otherwise there might be 
the problem that people want to generate a new key, but can't revoke 
the old one.
09/29/2007 Jan Schneider Comment #3
Priority ⇒ 2. Medium
State ⇒ Accepted
Reply to this comment
Agreed.
09/28/2007 Chuck Hagenbuch Comment #2
State ⇒ Feedback
Reply to this comment
Seems to me like if people use Horde to generate their key they should 
be able to download it at least at that specific time to back it up - 
and to get a warning then about losing it, etc. But otherwise this 
seems reasonable to me. Any other thoughts/objections?
09/27/2007 libre (at) immerda (dot) ch Comment #1
Summary ⇒ Minimize lacking PGP forward secrecy with webmail
Type ⇒ Enhancement
Queue ⇒ Horde Base
Priority ⇒ 3. High
State ⇒ New
Due ⇒ 09/27/2007
Reply to this comment
PGP lacks forward secrecy, i.e. once a secret key with corresponding 
passphrase is known to an attacker, all prior and all future mails can 
be decrypted if intercepted. Webmail applications are especially 
vulnerable to keylogger (or looking over ones shoulders) attacks 
because they are often used in insecure environments. Horde lets you 
export the secret key thus one successfull attacks suffices to 
compromise all prios and all future mails. I therefore suggest to omit 
this "feature" (exporting of the secret key) in future versions.

I think, it is not really important for users to export their secret 
key. If they wish to have a copy on their harddisk, they should have a 
secure place anyway and thus probably have the possibility to generate 
a key pair on this system and import it into Horde afterwards. If they 
want to change to a local mailsystem, they should generate a new key 
anyway if it was possible to export the key without their knowledge 
beforehand.